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Abstract 
Economic growth has become one of the leitmotivs academicians and pundits ask once and 
again to assess democratic endurance over time. While large portion of the literature posits that 
economic growth is positive for democracy (eg. Przeworski et al. 2000), for other scholars it is a 
profoundly destabilizing force (eg. Olson 1963; Huntington 1968). This paper fills these 
contrasting views asking whether economic growth can undermine democratic competition. We 
hypothesize that the relation between economic growth and party competition is mediated by 
the strength of political institutions and free expression. Economic growth promotes 
incumbency advantage. Rulers can artificially extend this advantage by narrowing the space for 
negative coverage and dissident voices as long as they have political room for maneuvering. We 
leverage exogenously-driven growth in Latin America to test this argument. Over the past two 
decades, the region experienced accelerated growth as a result of a global commodity boom. 
Using data for 18 Latin American countries during this period, we show that faster economic 
growth led to significant increases in incumbency advantage in the legislature only where free 
speech was under attack. Our findings have important implications for literatures on 
democratization, natural resources, and economic voting. 
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Introduction 
Political scientists have a love relationship with economic growth. Economic growth has 
become probably the first and crucial aspect we ask to have a picture of the performance of a 
country in a given time. Of course there are other considerations, such as inflation, 
unemployment, and debt (to mention just a few), but most of them are subordinated to growth. 
If growth is vigorous and positive, then the picture about that country is positive. A negative 
growth, on the contrary, regardless of unemployment, inflation, and debt, makes us wonder and 
worry.  
A shrinking economy has negative effects on democracy and a constantly shrinking 
economy might be a disaster for sustaining democracy. The reason is relative simple, a positive 
economic growth allows government and states to fulfil their policy objectives, expand basic 
services, provide a better standard of living to their populations. A shrinking economy, on the 
contrary, limits government’s basic aims. The discipline of political science has virtually not 
seriously challenged this common wisdom. In this work, we take a much more skeptical view of 
economic growth. As most of the literature, we sustain its importance but we qualify our views 
claiming that a positive and vital economic growth can, under certain conditions, endanger 
democratic stability and endurance.1  
Very few scholars challenge the traditional perspective we have on the relationship 
between economic growth and democracy. Some voices, however, have long warned us that 
rapid economic “is a profoundly destabilizing force” (Olson 1963, 531). Olson claims that a 
rapid economic expansion brings about shaking the foundations of patterns of production, 
consumption, and distribution, which erodes the prevailing order, producing, as he calls it, a 
“social dislocation” (533). 2  Moreover, a rapid economic growth constitutes a perfect 
environment for a revolution of rising expectations (Lerner 1958; Davies 1962). This is 
particularly so when the number of losers substantially increase and start comparing their 
situation with new benchmarks provided by the economic growth itself.3 In simpler words, 
people get mad when “they are not invited to the party.”  
																																								 																				
1  “It would be absurd to attempt to explain political instability through economic growth alone” (Olson 1963, 
543).  
2  This derives from the study of revolutions. He claims that those behind revolutionary movements (left or 
right) are usually those, the déclassé, with weak bonds to the established order, at least in terms of civil society.  
3  Olson was obviously not alone. Huntington makes an even bolder claim: “economic growth increases 
material well-being at one rate but social frustration at a faster rate” (Huntington 1968, 50). Yet, Huntington 
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Contemporary, the pace of economic growth is usually left aside, as far as it is positive. 
Recent works sustain that positive economic growth is always constructive. Przeworski et al 
(2000) argue that the evidence they have is robust from virtually all angles:  
“Democracies appear to be more sensitive to growth performance. When they face a 
decline in income, they die at the rate of 0.0512, so that about one in twenty of them 
dies, but when incomes are growing, they die at the rate of 0.0152, one in sixty-six. 
Moreover, democracies that grow slowly, at rates of less than 5 percent per annum, die at 
the rate of 0.0173, whereas those that grow at rates faster than 5 percent die at the rate 
of 0.0132” (Przeworski et al. 2000, 109).  
They continue and bluntly claim that “Olson (1963) and Huntington (1968) could not have been 
more wrong when they thought that rapid growth destabilized democracies” (ibid).4  
There is an evident and open contradiction between these contrasting views on the 
effects strong economic growth on democracy. This paper fills this gap claiming that rapid 
economic growth is detrimental for the democratic competition when the government has 
access to a significant share of the fresh resources coming from this growth and make a political 
use of this fresh surplus to cling to power. To maintain their power position, some governments 
curtail freedom of the press in order to bypass significant challengers. It does not mean, 
explained in due time, that rapid economic growth will be systematically exploited by the 
incumbent to curb democratic competition. Our focus on political competition reflects a 
scholarly consensus on the principle that vibrant competition is a necessary characteristic for a 
“high-quality” democratic process (Altman and Pérez-Liñán 1999, 2002; Coppedge 2004; 
Diamond and Morlino 2004; Munck 2004; O'Donnell 2004; Carlin 2006; Levine and Molina 
2011). 
We assess this argument by comparing the legislative advantage of incumbent 
governments in Latin America between 1990 and 2013. We use Latin America for two reasons. 
First, Latin American countries benefitted from an extraordinary economic boom staring around 
2003. In general lines, this era of prosperity encouraged the adoption of innovative social 
policies, facilitated reductions in poverty and inequality, and, in some cases, allowed for the 
replacement of discredited political elites. However, prosperity had uneven consequences for 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																											
acknowledges that the relationship between economic growth and political stability varies with the level of 
economic development and therefor is more complicated than assumed (1968, 49-53). 
4  Some scholars show nuances on the effect of rapid economic growth has on democracy (Haggard and 
Kaufman 2016). Moreover, they might appear as skeptics, but still they do not challenge the essence of this 
relationship. Other scholars, however, have argued that windfall revenues can hinder democratization (Ross 
2001; Gervasoni 2010). 
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political competition. In some of the region’s countries, economic windfalls reinforced pluralist 
politics (Lanzaro 2001). In others, by contrast, revenues were used by incumbent governments 
to sustain intolerant strategies vis-à-vis their opponents (Weyland 2013). Because this regional 
economic boom was driven exogenously by the expansion of global commodity prices between 
2003 and 2014, we analyze the decades before and after the commodity boom to minimize 
concerns about economic growth being endogenously determined by the quality of democratic 
institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2008; Bernhard et al. 2015). Second, Latin America has a preferred 
spot in the literature on democracy, its breakdowns (Linz and Stepan 1978), transitions 
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), consolidation (O'Donnell 1996), or even quality (Munck 2016). 
Using this region back again, we fine-tune with previous works accumulation in the field. 
The first section of this paper explores the contradictory effects of economic growth and 
identifies the mechanisms by which economic prosperity can undercut party competition. 
During periods of fast social advancement, political leaders are uniquely positioned to constrain 
the parameters of public deliberation, embracing a model of intolerant progress. The second 
section describes the exogenously-driven commodity boom and how it provided a unique 
window of opportunity to overcome unpopular neo-liberal policies in Latin America over the 
past 15 years. In the third section we introduce our dependent variable—a measure of the 
incumbent’s advantage in the legislature—and document the reduction of political pluralism in 
some contemporary regimes, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, but not in 
others, such as Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The third section introduces our predictors and tests 
the moderating effect of free speech on the negative consequences of economic growth using 
data for 18 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2013. The results show that fast 
economic growth funded a decline in electoral competition when intolerant governments were 
able to restrict free speech. These findings hold even when we control for the effect of 
alternative moderators. The conclusions explore how economic progress may, paradoxically, 
undermine the sustainability of democracy and social equality over the long run. Our 
contribution lies at the intersection of institutional studies of democratic quality and resurgent 
debates in political economy (Luna et al. 2014).  
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I. Economic Growth, Competition and Free Speech 
The literature on political modernization has argued that economic development facilitates 
democratization (Boix 2011; Epstein et al. 2006), stabilizes democratic regimes (Przeworski et al. 
2000), and improves the quality of democratic systems (Diamond 1999).5 Several mechanisms 
are invoked to account for these positive effects: growth drives social and structural 
transformations that support political pluralism (Ansell and Samuels 2014), it eases social 
conflict and redistributive tensions (Lipset 1959), and it reduces the risk of coups in new 
democracies (Svolik 2015; Kim 2016). As development is critical for modernization which has its 
correlates on democratization, and development is reached through a continuous process of 
economic growth, economic growth cannot but have a positive impact on democratization. 
Economic growth has become the leitmotiv academics and pundits reiterate once and again.  
Nonetheless, the literature on natural resources argues that windfalls—particularly 
growth resulting from the exploitation of raw materials or foreign aid—reduces prospects for 
democratization by empowering incumbent governments. Rulers may use extraordinary 
revenues to strengthen their repressive apparatus, minimize accountability, expand patronage, 
and reinforce incumbency advantage (Karl 1990; Ross 2001; Paler 2013). Others have qualified 
this view, noting resource-based growth can benefit democracy when rents placate the effects of 
social inequality or when a competitive regime is already in place (Morrison 2014; Dunning 
2008). This is not to be read as a straight line that goes from the economy to politics, but to the 
political use of resources.   
We focus on a specific manifestation of this problem: Can rapid growth strengthen 
incumbent governments and undermine party competition in democratic regimes? Svolik argues 
that democracies are always exposed to incumbent takeovers, but finds that, on average, 
economic growth reduces this peril (Svolik 2015). By contrast, Wantchekon claims that in rentier 
states, growth breeds incumbency advantage because rulers enjoy informational advantages and 
can politicize the budget (Wantchekon 2002). Again, the key aspect here is the political use of 
these resources aimed to improvements in the government power position, their incumbency 
advantage.  
Our question transcends the specific context of rentier states. In Latin American 
presidential democracies, a buoyant economy encourages retrospective voting in favor of the 
incumbent (Healy and Malhotra 2013; Benton 2005; Powell and Whitten 1993; Campello and 
																																								 																				
5  See also (Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix and Stokes 2003; Przeworski et al. 2000).  
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Zucco 2016). Irrespective of whether voters assign credit for the state of the economy to the 
incumbent, rising government revenues facilitate the adoption of popular policies such as 
subsidies, and cash transfers.  
This form of incumbency advantage resulting from retrospective voting is generally seen 
as transient and unproblematic for the democratic process. Voters are expected to shift their 
allegiances in the next election if new information shows that economic conditions have soured, 
that government policies have undesirable side-effects, or that policy gains are secure and new 
issues must dominate the campaign (Weyland 2000; Corrêa and Cheibub 2016; Zucco 2013).  
Incumbency advantage is transitory when free flows of information allow voters to 
update their beliefs about the government and the world. Even if voters credit the incumbent 
with a good economy, the media will place new items in the voters’ agenda and balance their 
retrospective assessment of past achievements against prospective considerations for unresolved 
policy issues. Thus, we hypothesize that economic growth will produce limited advantages for the incumbent 
in a context of strong political institutions and free expression, but it will allow rulers to consolidate significant 
institutional advantages when free flows of information are constrained and institutions weak.  
If free press is vigorous and institutions work as expected, economic growth and 
democracy find a positive synergy. Examples abound, but let us mention just a couple: The 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (formerly known as The Norwegian Oil Fund), 
famines in India. Once Norway discovered wealthy oil reserves and started to exploit them in 
the early 1970s the question was what to do with such amount of resources spurring into the 
national economy. With a small but ageing population, the government created a fund in the 
mid-1980s to be invested for the long term, but also to be used in case of drop in petroleum 
revenue. Actually, it was just in March 2016 that the government withdraw money the very first 
time since the fund was created.6   
Famines are easy to prevent if there is a serious effort to do so, and a democratic 
government, facing elections and criticisms from opposition parties and independent 
newspapers, cannot help but make such an effort. Not surprisingly, while India 
continued to have famines under British rule right up to independence (…), they 
disappeared suddenly with the establishment of a multiparty democracy and a free press 
(Sen 1999, 8). 
																																								 																				
6  For a comprehensive view of the fund and how is performing see: https://www.nbim.no/  
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Understanding the transient nature of their advantage, some rulers attempt to artificially 
prolong their success by constraining the ability of voters to acquire new information. Two 
strategies deserve special attention. First, governments seek to dominate flows of information 
directly, regulating news content, or indirectly, regulating media ownership and subsidizing or 
acquiring friendly media outlets (Kellam and Stein 2016). These practices often induce self-
censorship among news organizations. Second, rulers downplay the value of negative 
information by adopting an intolerant discourse, denouncing carriers of bad news as 
representatives of illegitimate interests (Skowronek 1997). This strategy questions the validity of 
adverse information, polarizes partisan positions, and reinforces party identity among followers 
and adversaries (Lupu 2014). Prompted by this discourse, government followers harass their 
critics in journalism, universities, cultural activities, and even in the public bureaucracy.  
Although such harassment is occasionally violent, more often critics are denied public 
employment or subject to cyber-bullying and workplace mobbing because of their views. 
Like other forms of electoral misconduct, these practices do not automatically transform 
a democratic regime into a non-democracy, but they reduce the flow of information, limit the 
ability of voters to update their beliefs, and delay the successful emergence of party competition, 
even after the economic boom has receded (Donno and Roussias 2012; Alt et al. 2016).  
We argue that intolerant politics is a distinctive example of structured contingency,  a 
process by which structural conditions and contingent political choices have ultimately shaped 
lasting democratic trajectories (Karl 1990). While the ability of presidents to embrace intolerant 
strategies can be facilitated by access to economic resources or limited by legislatures and other 
veto players (Murillo et al. 2013), these practices are shaped, to a great extent, by institutional 
windows of opportunity and the rulers’ commitment to democratic norms (Mainwaring and 
Pérez-Liñán 2013; Kellam and Stein 2016). Public resources may fund loyal media outlets, and 
weak institutions may fail to block restrictive media policies, but the government’s willingness to 
manipulate free expression is determined by opportunities and normative preferences. Although 
this is a power game within the limits imposed by structural and institutional forces, 
governments have agency too.   
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II. Latin America after Neoliberalism 
Around 2003, a major commodity boom created a historical opportunity for primary exports 
originating in Latin America. Between 2000 and 2008 the total value of exports increased 
annually by 21 percent in Peru, by 17 percent in Brazil and Chile, and by 13 percent in Argentina 
(Ros 2013). Much of this growth was spurred by the expansion of the Chinese economy, which 
enlarged global demand for minerals, energy, and foodstuffs. The expansion of Asian markets 
swelled consumption of soybeans from Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay; gas and minerals 
from Bolivia; oil from Ecuador and Venezuela; copper from Chile and Peru. Between 2006 and 
2011, South American exports to China grew three times faster than exports to the rest of the 
world (Urcuyo 2013: 10; Ros 2013: 2-3).7 
Our focus on the 1990-2013 period thus has a distinctive advantage. Because the rise of 
growth rates in the second half of the period was driven by an exogenous demand for primary 
products, this sample minimizes concerns about endogenous economic growth being the result 
of better domestic institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2008; Bernhard et al. 2015; Persson and Tabellini 
2003). Against classic tenets of dependency theory, terms of trade appreciated in favor of 
primary exports during the first decade of the twenty-first century (Ros 2013: 4; Campello and 
Zucco 2016).8  
Figure 1 shows the striking contrast between the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Between 
1995 and 2002, the average rate of annual growth in per capita GDP was negative in Argentina, 
Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and remained below 1% in Brazil, Mexico, and Peru (data 
from the World Development Indicators). Between 2003 and 2010 Argentina’s per capita 
income grew at an average rate of 7 percent,9 Peru and Uruguay, at 5 percent, Venezuela at 4 
percent, Brazil and Chile, at 3 percent, and Bolivia and Ecuador, above 2 percent per year. 
Similar data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean indicate that 
the average per capita domestic product in Latin America expanded from 5,768 dollars in 
current prices in 2006 to 9,850 dollars in 2013 (CEPAL 2015).  
																																								 																				
7  Between 2000 and 2013, China’s trade with the region “increased 22 fold from just over 12.0 billion dollars 
to almost 275.0 billion dollars. By way of comparison, the region’s trade with the world only tripled during 
that time” (http://bit.ly/1SISCGM). It has also become the first trade partner of smaller economies, such as 
Uruguay (http://bit.ly/1M17Bo4). 
8  Mazzuca recalls that “In 2002, a hundred metric tons of soybeans—a major Argentine agricultural export—
had the same value as a small Honda car. Ten years later, that same amount of soybeans would buy a BMW 
convertible” (Mazzuca 2013: 110). 
9  Values for Argentina may be slightly inflated by the manipulation of government statistics, which have 
prevented the World Bank from estimating per capita growth rates since 2007. Rates for 2007-10 were 
approximated based on per capita income figures in current dollars.  
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Figure 1. Economic Growth before and after 2003 
 
This inflow of public revenue provided necessary resources to address severe legacies of 
the twentieth century. In the 1990s, industrial employment declined and the informal sector 
expanded (Portes and Hoffman 2003). Social mobilization against neoliberal policies created 
government instability (Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007), undermined traditional parties 
(Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012), and encouraged clientelism (e.g. Levitsky 2003). The political 
environment was mature enough for a new ideological turn to the left.  
The crisis of the late 1990s benefitted an “untainted” left, which represented a credible 
alternative to the status-quo. Propelled by the commodity boom after 2003, leftist governments 
were in a privileged position to implement progressive policies, including means-tested subsidies 
for the poor and the direct provision of goods and services (e.g. De La O 2015). Some rightwing 
government of the time transited through similar policies.  
Estimates by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
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from 38% to 19% in Brazil, from 51% to 34% in Ecuador, and from 45% to 26% in Venezuela 
(CEPAL 2015). Improvements in social conditions reflected the effect of economic growth 
combined with proactive social policies. Morgan and Kelly show that public investment in health 
and education moderated the effects of economic growth on social outcomes: economic growth 
reduced inequality only when investment in human capital was above 7% of GDP. The benefits 
of economic growth were more equally distributed where “market-conditioning” policies 
strengthened the autonomous capacity of the poor to take advantage of an economic boom 
(Morgan and Kelly 2013). 
However, this extraordinary period of prosperity and social progress had ambiguous 
effects on free speech and political competition. Emboldened by growing approval rates, some 
Latin American governments—but not all—adopted intolerant stances vis-à-vis their opponents. 
They engaged in what Kurt Weyland called “discriminatory legalism,” using their legal authority 
to undermine their opponents and narrow the range of information available to voters (Weyland 
2013). 
The region supplies several examples of strategies intended to undermine freedom of 
expression where it fully existed or to curtail it where was already weak. First, governments 
undercut critical media and supported the emergence of friendly outlets (Kellam and Stein 2016). 
Waisbord identifies a “populist” strategy towards the mass media, characterized by legislative 
attempts to reshape the media system, the use of lawsuits to intimidate opposition editors, the 
president’s discretional allocation of state advertisement and telecommunication licenses, and the 
pragmatic accommodation of media companies willing to support the incumbent in power 
(Waisbord 2013).  
For example, the telecommunications law adopted in Argentina in 2009 was directed 
against the largest media corporation in the country, and it was implemented discretionally when 
dealing with government allies. In Ecuador, President Correa sued critical journalists and 
newspaper editors, and the judiciary imposed millionaire fines and prison sentences—that 
Correa occasionally pardoned—against them. In Nicaragua, government advertising benefitted 
President Ortega’s family and friends, while newspapers with 60 percent of the readership 
received less than 3 percent of public investment (Waisbord 2013: 71-72; Kellam and Stein 
2016). The media law adopted in Venezuela in 2004 banned messages altering public order, 
disrespecting public authorities, or provoking anxiety among citizens. The government cancelled 
or failed to renew broadcasting licenses for some opposition networks and imposed repeated 
fines on others (some even beyond those that had supported the 2002 coup attempt). By 2014, 
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television channels critical to the government no longer existed, and a few struggled to keep a 
balanced coverage (Danielson et al. 2015).10  
Second, leaders in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, 
embraced an intolerant discourse against critics, questioning their motivations and demanding 
that journalists and citizens adopt positions based on political loyalties rather than evidence 
(Waisbord 2013). This strategy was adopted by governments on the right (e.g., Alvaro Uribe in 
Colombia) and on the left (e.g., Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela) of the 
political spectrum. Leftist governments in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Uruguay, by contrast, 
generally expressed respect for critical arguments.  
Discursive strategies aimed at thwarting free expression often reached dramatic 
overtones. For example, in August 2014, the President of the Aragua State Medical Association 
alerted Venezuelans about the possible outbreak of an infectious disease and the lack of 
medicines in public hospitals. Because the doctor was linked to opposition groups, government 
officials reacted aggressively: the vice-president of the National Assembly accused him of 
“vandalism;” Venezuela’s prosecutor general initiated an investigation against the physician; the 
governor of Aragua charged him with terrorism and ordered his arrest; and President Maduro 
denounced that right-wing groups were orchestrating a bacteriological attack in Venezuela, with 
Aragua being the prime target.11  
The main target of such intolerant politics—and the focus of our empirical analysis—
was party competition. While many traditional parties were hurt by the crisis of neo-liberalism, 
some governments took advantage of this situation to undermine all forms of organized 
opposition. The effects of this strategy were cumulative and sequential: in the midst of a crisis, 
an intransigent discourse facilitated initial electoral success; electoral success led to greater 
control over elective institutions and state resources; partisan use of state resources yielded 
greater control over non-elective institutions, such as the judiciary and the bureaucracy, and the 
action (or inaction) those institutions was ultimately instrumental to undermine critical media 
outlets, in ways that prolonged the government’s institutional advantage (see Levitsky and Way 
2010).  The electoral foundation of this process produced “vexing ambiguity” among many 
democratic observers (Bermeo 2016). 
																																								 																				
10  Governments also restricted the amount of public information available to their critics. Leaders shunned 
press conferences in favor of more controlled political meetings and manipulated governments statistics. 
Based on the amount of statistical information reported to the World Bank, Hollyer et al.’s Transparency 
Index shows a considerable decline in the relative position of countries like Argentina or Bolivia after 2003 
(Hollyer et al. 2014). 
11  For BBC reports on the case, see: http://bbc.in/1QWi0VO ; http://bbc.in/1KchNOQ   
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III. Empirical Evidence 
We have hypothesized that the relation between economic growth and the consolidation of 
governmental advantage is moderated by free speech. To test this argument, we employ data for 
18 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2013. The dependent variable in our study is a 
measure of the government’s advantage in legislative contests. Data on per capita income growth 
was obtained from the World Development Indicators (see Figure 1), and data on free speech 
was obtained from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. 
Government Advantage. To measure the advantage obtained by incumbents in the political 
process, we develop an index of government advantage in the legislature.12 The index ranges 
between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating complete government control of the lower house of congress. 
This measure is based on two principles. First, it employs the distribution of legislative seats to 
assess the government’s effective institutional advantage. Public opinion may be less of a 
concern when the electoral system favors the incumbent, or when malapportionment favors 
regional strongholds of the ruling party. Rulers ultimately seek to maximize institutional control 
(seats) rather than votes. Second, the index accounts for the degree of fragmentation among 
opposition forces by comparing the size of the ruling party against the size of the typical 
opposition party in congress. A highly fragmented opposition is crippled by coordination 
problems, offering additional advantages to the government. At the same time, even the 
president’s party may be small in a fragmented multiparty system. Its relative advantage must be 
assessed by comparison to the typical opposition forces. 
Let oi be the proportion of seats controlled by the i-th opposition party in the lower 
chamber.  The size of the “typical” opponent is defined as	𝑂 = ∑%&'∑%& . The sum of squared party 
shares weights the score in favor of larger parties and punishes legislative fragmentation (Altman 
and Pérez-Liñán 2002; Laakso and Taagepera 1979). Similarly, let gi be the proportion of seats 
controlled by the ruling party (in a single-party government) or by the i-th party in the 
government’s coalition.  The size of the “typical” government party is	𝐺 = ∑)&'∑)&  . 
The index of legislative advantage is simply defined as G – O. Greater values indicate a 
greater institutional imbalance in favor of the government. To preserve the range of this measure 
																																								 																				
12  Altman and Pérez-Liñán’s (2002) develop a similar index of effective competition, which reflects imbalances 
in favor of the government as well as the opposition. Because large imbalances in favor of the opposition are 
rare, our results hold even when this alternative measure is used as the dependent variable. Results available 
on request.  
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bound between 0 and 1, the index acquires a value of 1 if the opposition controls no seats in the 
lower house (i.e., when O is not defined), and a value of 0 when O > G (i.e., when the 
government has no advantage at all).  
Figure 2 compares the evolution of this measure for all countries in our sample. In the 
1990s, some countries witnessed a decline of the government’s legislative advantage, either as a 
result of increasing fragmentation of the party system (e.g., Colombia) or due to the demise of a 
hegemonic party (Mexico). By contrast, after 2003 several countries, including Bolivia and 
Ecuador, experienced an erosion of competitiveness and a consolidation of the government’s 
legislative advantage.  In Venezuela, this effect was compounded by the opposition’s boycott of 
the 2005 legislative election. 
 
Figure 2. Government’s Legislative Advantage 
 
Free Speech. We measure the emergence of an intolerant environment using the Freedom 
of Expression Index developed by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (v. 5) 
(Coppedge et al. 2015a). The index reflects point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis 
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of seven items capturing government attempts to censor—directly or indirectly—print and 
broadcast media, attempts to censor the internet, harassment of journalists, media self-
censorship, freedom of academic and cultural expression, and two items capturing freedom of 
discussion for men and women. Information for these items originates in an expert survey 
involving country specialists throughout the globe.13  
Figure 3 shows the evolution of free expression in the 18 Latin American countries; 
observed values for the index range between 0.17 (low freedom) and 0.98 (high freedom), with a 
mean value of 0.80. Sharp positive movements are evident in El Salvador after the signature of 
the Chapultepec Peace Accords and in Peru after the end of Alberto Fujimori’s era. Erosions of 
free expression took place after the arrival in office of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and, to a 
lesser extent, of Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Patterns of free 
expression, however, do not map consistently into rates of economic growth (Figure 1) or levels 
of political competition (Figure 2). 
Figure 3. Freedom of Expression Index
 
																																								 																				
13  The V-Dem project operationalizes a wide range of democratic principles using more than 350 questions 
with well-defined response categories. More than 3,000 experts across the globe have participated in the 
survey, and typically a minimum of five independent experts complete each question for every country-year. 
V-Dem uses Bayesian ordinal item response theory (IRT) models to estimate latent country characteristics 
from the collection of expert ratings (https://v-dem.net/en/) (Coppedge et al. 2015b).  
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To assess the impact of economic growth and free expression on party competition, we 
estimate four panel models using the index of legislative advantage as the dependent variable. 
The rate of economic growth (lagged one year), the Freedom of Expression index (lagged one 
year), and an interaction between the two terms are our main predictors. We expect economic 
growth (in the absence of free flows of information) to display a positive coefficient and the 
interaction term to display a negative sign, indicating that the effects of economic growth on the 
government’s ability to consolidate its power will vanish as flows of information become more 
open.  
The models include several variables to distinguish the effect of our main predictors 
from possible alternative explanations. To control for the effect of electoral systems, social 
cleavages, and other conditions that may influence the number of parties gaining seats in 
congress, we incorporate the effective number of parties in the legislature (Laakso and 
Taagepera 1979). Because many features of the regime other than the nature of public 
deliberation may affect the environment for political competition, we include the Polity score 
(lagged by one year) as a general measure of democratization (Marshall 2014). In addition, we 
control for the presence of an interim government (interim rulers with no formal support in 
congress score low in the dependent variable because the “opposition” dominates the 
legislature), for the presence of a coalition government (coalitions including small parties will 
score lower in the dependent variable), and for per capita GDP (to distinguish the effects of 
economic growth from the overall effects of economic development).  
Table 1 presents the results of the analysis. The first column (1.1) reports estimates for a 
dynamic model including only our main predictors and the lagged dependent variable. Control 
variables are incorporated in column (1.2). The results of this model suggest that, in the absence 
of free speech, a one-percent expansion in per-capita income would yield an expected increase 
of 0.07 points in the 0-1 scale of legislative advantage over the long run.14 This represents 43% 
of one standard deviation for the dependent variable. Model (1.3) accounts for the panel 
structure of the data by assuming that the initial level of legislative advantage in each country is 
independent from the predictors and normally distributed. By contrast, Model (1.4) reflects the 
panel structure by centering all variables at the country mean. Dynamic, random-effects, and 
fixed-effects estimators confirm the same result: in an intolerant environment, economic growth 
hinders party competition and reinforces incumbency advantage, but this effect disappears in a 
context of free expression. 
																																								 																				
14  The long-run multiplier for the dynamic model is 0.02/(1 – 0.72) = 0.07. 
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Table 1. Models of Party Competition 
 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) 
 Dynamic Dynamic Random Fixed 
   effects effects 
Growth, t-1 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Free expression, t-1 -0.05 -0.01 -0.13* -0.15* 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
Free expression*Growth -0.02** -0.02** -0.03** -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ENP (House)  -0.01** -0.05** -0.06** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Polity, t-1  -0.00 -0.02** -0.02** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Crisis caretaker  -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Coalition government  -0.01 -0.04** -0.05** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Per capita income, t-1  0.00 0.00** 0.00** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Leg. advantage, t-1 0.78** 0.72**   
 (0.03) (0.03)   
Constant 0.07* 0.12** 0.56** 0.58** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
N 431 431 432 432 
R2 (within) 0.668 0.685 0.397 0.400 
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
Figure 4 presents the marginal effects of economic growth at different levels of Freedom 
of Expression. Under all estimators, economic growth produces a positive and statistically 
significant expansion of the government’s advantage when free expression is constrained, but it 
fails to create any advantage for the government when deliberation is open. To adjust for the 
possibility of random discoveries, the plots present 99% confidence intervals (Esarey and 
Lawrence 2012).  
  
	
	
18	
Figure 4. Marginal Effect of Economic Growth on Legislative Advantage (99% CI) 
 
To provide a substantive interpretation of the results, consider the following predictions 
based on Model (1.4): An economic growth rate of 6% would produce an expected expansion in 
legislative advantage of 0.05 per year in a country with levels of free expression similar to 
Venezuela in 2012 (0.55). By contrast, an equivalent rate of growth would produce a change in 
legislative advantage indistinguishable from zero (-0.01) in a country with a deliberative 
environment similar to Uruguay (0.98). 
Alternative Moderators. Arguably, other factors could also moderate the effect of economic 
growth on the government’s ability to consolidate its legislative advantage. For example, 
Mazzuca (2013) claims that rentier populism succeeded where fast economic growth coincided 
with a protracted crisis in the party system and in the financial markets, and Mainwaring and 
Pérez-Liñán (2015) note that the erosion of political competition took place where presidents 
confronted poorly institutionalized party systems and weak state institutions.  These arguments 
suggest that institutionalized party systems may be more resistant to the translation of economic 
growth into incumbency advantage. The argument is problematic, however, because a declining 
institutionalization of the party system is in part the result of actions taken by the government to 
undermine the opposition. 
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Similarly, it is possible that the real factor translating economic growth into incumbency 
advantage is the use of public resources to undermine the fairness of the electoral process 
(Norris 2014; Donno and Roussias 2012). Moreover, a general deterioration in the quality of 
public deliberation, more than any specific constraints on free expression, could undermine the 
ability of voters to update their beliefs. Because these conditions are likely to be correlated with 
an erosion of free speech, they are potential confounders in the translation of economic growth 
into government advantage. 
To account for these alternative explanations, Table 2 incorporates three additional 
predictors (and their interactions with economic growth): party system institutionalization, clean 
elections, and the quality of deliberation. All three measures originate in the V-Dem project, and 
they combine multiple indicators through Bayesian factor analysis. The party system 
institutionalization index combines items for the strength of party organizations, party branches, 
party linkages, distinct party platforms, and legislative party cohesion. The measure of clean 
elections reflects the autonomy of the election management board’s (EMB), EMB capacity, the 
quality of voter registry, vote buying, irregularities in voting, election government intimidation, 
electoral violence, and a free and fair process. The index of deliberation combines five items 
measuring reasoned justification, common good justification, respect for counterarguments, the 
range of consultation among elites, and the presence of an engaged society for each country-
year. Information for these items originates in V-Dem’s expert survey (Coppedge et al. 2015b). 
Table 2 presents three models including alternative moderators. The first column 
replicates Model 1.4 from Table 1; the remaining equations add an additional factor (interaction 
term) to regulate the effect of economic growth on government advantage. In all models, the 
baseline coefficient for economic growth is positive and significant, indicating that growth 
reinforces government advantage when the moderating conditions acquire values of zero.   
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Table 2. Models with Alternative Moderators 
 (1.4) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 
 Fixed effects Parties Elections Deliberation 
Growth, t-1 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Free expression, t-1 -0.15* -0.23** -0.14+ -0.19* 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
Free expression*Growth -0.02* -0.02 -0.02 -0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
ENP (House) -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Polity, t-1 -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Crisis caretaker -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Coalition government -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Per cap GDP, t-1 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Party instit., t-1  0.20+   
  (0.11)   
Party instit.*Growth  -0.02   
  (0.01)   
Clean elections, t-1   -0.04  
   (0.09)  
Clean elections*Growth   -0.01  
   (0.01)  
Deliberation, t-1    0.06 
    (0.09) 
Deliberation*Growth    0.02 
    (0.02) 
Constant 0.58** 0.51** 0.59** 0.56** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
N 432 432 432 432 
R2 0.400 0.407 0.403 0.403 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 
Because in these models two factors concurrently filter the effects of economic growth, 
the marginal effect of growth on the dependent variable is ∂y/∂x = b1 + b2F + b3Z, where y 
represents government advantage in the legislature, x is the rate of economic growth, F is the 
level of free expression, Z is the level of the alternative moderator, b1 is the baseline coefficient 
for economic growth in models 2.1-2.3, b2 is the coefficient for the interaction between free 
expression and growth, and b3 is the coefficient for the interaction between the second 
moderator and growth.   
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To assess the effect of these alternative explanations, Figure 5 presents the marginal 
effects of economic growth at different levels of Freedom of expression (in the horizontal axis) 
as well as at different levels of Party system institutionalization (in the first column), Free and 
fair elections (second column), and Deliberation (third column). Figures 5.1a, 5.2a, and 5.3a in 
the first row show the conditional effect of economic growth when the three alternative 
mediators are held at the minimum observed values. Figures 5.1b, 5.2b, and 5.3b in the second 
row display the effects when alternative mediators are held at their maximum values in the 
sample.  
 
Figure 5. Marginal Effect of Economic Growth with Alternative Moderators (99% CI) 
 
The results in the first row of Figure 5 show that, even under adverse conditions, 
economic growth only produces a significant advantage for the government if free expression is 
constrained. This explains why attacks against free expression are a crucial instrument in the 
toolkit of governments seeking to consolidate power. The second row suggests that, under very 
favorable conditions—strong parties, fair elections, vibrant public discourse—free expression as 
such becomes less relevant as a mediator.  However, empirical examples of those configurations 
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are extremely rare because these favorable scenarios naturally imply a context of free speech.  It 
is virtually impossible to find sample support for instances of fair elections or strong deliberation 
without free expression. Thus, to the extent that free expression is a precondition for fair 
elections and vibrant deliberation, the inclusion of these controls in the model induces post-
treatment bias in favor of the null hypothesis.   
 
IV. Structure, Agency, and the Peril of Intolerant 
Politics 
The example of Latin America in the early twenty-first century allows us to show that rapid rates 
of economic growth have ambiguous consequences for democratic party competition.  This fact 
has important normative implications: irrespective of the specific conception of democracy 
embraced—such as liberal, participatory, majoritarian, consensus, deliberative, or egalitarian 
(Coppedge et al. 2011)—political competition is a necessary component of democracy and a 
crucial dimension of democratic quality (Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002; Diamond 2005; Levine 
and Molina 2007). 
The empirical evidence supports the main hypothesis advanced in this paper: when 
economic growth takes place in a context of free expression, incumbency advantage is transient 
and political pluralism is able to flourish. However, when leaders adopt an intolerant discourse 
and undermine independent voices, economic growth only facilitates the pursuit of a hegemonic 
project. This insight is confirmed by contemporary Latin American cases using different 
statistical estimators, and even after accounting for alternative mediators.  
Although the Latin American experience provides an opportunity to leverage 
exogenously-driven growth to explore this hypothesis, our empirical findings are relevant to 
understand other cases of intolerant progress, such Hungary, Turkey, and Russia. The findings 
imply that, because the commodity boom receded after 2014, the ability of these governments to 
control the public sphere without significant repression will soon decline considerably. However, 
citizens will take longer to update their beliefs and challenge incumbents where governments 
have already undermined free speech and dismantled alternative sources of information. 
Our conclusions also transcend any ideological concern for the left in Latin America. 
Early attempts to dichotomize between a “good” (institutional, democratic) and a “bad” 
(populist, authoritarian) left simply reflect the heterogeneous strategies embraced by progressive 
political leaders during this period (Castañeda and Morales 2008; Weyland 2009; Levitsky and 
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Roberts 2011; Luna and Filgueira 2009).15 Intolerance has also being practiced by right-wing 
leaders such as Uribe in Colombia or Orbán in Hungary, to mention just a couple.  
Perhaps the most serious implication of our findings is that the politics of intolerant 
progress may have long-lasting social and economic consequences. The combination of windfall 
revenues and innovative social policies improved social conditions for the poor throughout the 
region. But intolerance also undermined the quality of democratic institutions, and several 
studies have suggested that strong democratic competition is a precondition for sustained 
growth and for sustained reductions in inequality (Huber and Stephens. 2012; Padovano and 
Ricciuti 2008; Besley et al. 2010). This resembles an almost perfect catch-22 situation.  
Why are some governments willing to embrace an intolerant discourse while many 
others are not? Particular structural and institutional conditions may facilitate the emergence of 
intolerant politics. For example, Mazzuca (2013) claimed that rentier populism prevailed where 
fast economic growth coincided with limited access to financial markets, and Buquet (2007) 
argued incumbents are more inclined to embrace exclusionary electoral rules when they 
represent a growing political force. However, those conditions were detrimental only where 
presidents had hegemonic ambitions.  
 
  
																																								 																				
15  See also (Harbers et al. 2013; Jahn 2014; Williams 2015).  
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